DATA: 83% of Iran-Linked Attacks Struck Arab States, Not The Party to the War (Israel)
The Horizon Brief | 7 April 2026
“39 days, 7,911+ projectiles: Arab states have absorbed 4.9 times more Iran-linked strikes than Israel. The big picture is, Iran can fire over double ammunition than it has at least.”
Bottom Line Up Front
Through 7 April 2026, Iran-linked forces have delivered 7,911+ projectiles across thirteen theatres in 39 days. Arab states absorbed approximately 83% of total Iran-linked campaign volume; GCC states alone account for approximately 75%. Though a fromal party to the war on Iran, Israel’s share stands at approximately 17%. The paradox is clear: The Arab states have collectively received 4.9 times more strikes than Israel. The munition profile is drone-dominant at 68.2%, concentrated heavily across Gulf theatres. Taken together, these figures are structurally inconsistent with a campaign oriented primarily against Israel or even the US. They are consistent with a sustained cost-imposition operation targeting the GCC states to disrupt life normalcy, undermine the Gulf model, disrupt energy markets, and therefore pressure the US indirectly to recalculate costs. The US, however, is least impacted by the war, compared to the Gulf or Asian consumers, China and Japan included.
Campaign Overview
The Horizon Strike Monitor records 7,911+ Iran-linked projectiles between 28 February and 7 April 2026. Strike volume is distributed across 13 countries and theatres, with five states accounting for approximately 87% of total campaign load.
∙ 🇦🇪 The UAE: 2,221 drones, 520 ballistic missiles, 26 cruise missiles — 2,767+ total (35.0%)
∙ 🔴 Israel: ~765 drones, ~585–600 missiles — ~1,350–1,365 total (17.1%)
∙ 🇰🇼 Kuwait: 803 drones, 365 missiles — 1,168+ total (14.8%)
∙ 🇸🇦 Saudi Arabia: 846 drones, 85 missiles — 931+ total (11.8%)
∙ 🇧🇭 Bahrain: 477 drones, 188 missiles — 665+ total (8.4%)
∙ 🇮🇶 Iraq: 340+ mixed payload (4.3%)
∙ 🇶🇦 Qatar: 111 drones, 205 missiles — 316+ total (4.0%)
∙ 🇯🇴 Jordan: 145 drones, 146 missiles — 291+ total (3.7%)
∙ 🇸🇾 Syria: 50+ mixed payload (0.6%)
∙ 🇴🇲 Oman: 20+ drones (0.25%)
∙ 🇨🇾 Cyprus: 5 drones (0.06%)
∙ 🇹🇷 Türkiye: 4 missiles (0.05%)
∙ 🇺🇸 Diego Garcia: 2 missiles (0.03%)
Brief Analytical Observations
Three structural patterns emerge from the distribution and are established across 39 days of Iran-linked to warrant analytical confidence.
The Gulf states constitute the campaign’s primary pressure point. The UAE, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia collectively absorbed 61.6% of all recorded strikes. This is reflects deliberate targeting of vital energy assets, basing, logistics, and financial infrastructure to globalise the costs of war, given the IRGC’s horizontal escalation warfare strategy and the Gulf’s share of global energy market supplies. The GCC states have been the principal targets of Iran’s coercive campaign conducted under the political cover of the US-Iran-Israel conflict, highlighting structural historical legacies, and Iranian motives, among others further to strategic goals.
The munition profile across Gulf theatres is analytically distinct. The UAE sustains a UAV share of approximately 80%, and more so by percentage Saudi Arabia at 91%. Drone-dominant targeting at this scale has been optimised for air defence saturation, interceptor depletion, kinetic destruction of vital assets given the makeup of defence systems, and the imposition of cumulative economic and psychological costs on US strategic partners. This reflects dual objectives: attrition and infrastructure-centric destruction.
Each interception consumes stockpile, and increasingly, political capital, at a cost that structurally favours the attacker: IRGC and network of militias, from Iraqi militias to the Houthi insurgency. Across 7,900+ strikes, Iran’s asymmetric warfare of attrition and destruction has been the campaign’s operational mechanism, with sporadic deployment of missiles in the post-sock phase for different reasons.
Hence, missile employment has been concentrated in some theatres more than others. Israel has recently emerged as the most missile-intensive theatre by proportion; this was not the case in the first three weeks of war. Qatar’s strike profile (205 missiles against 111 drones in 316+ total strikes) is anomalous relative to other Gulf states and is consistent with deliberate targeting of Al Udeid Air Base, the largest US air base in the Middle East, as well as vital energy assets including LNG, despite Doha’s mediation role in the past. Jordan’s near-parity between drone and missile employment suggests an interdiction logic directed against air corridor assets and radar infrastructure supporting coalition operations, rather than the attrition model applied to Gulf partners, but also direct attempts to expand collateral damage given the country’s long pushback against Iran’s expansionist crescent model. Zooming out, Diego Garcia Base’s two ballistic missile strikes, operationally limited in effect, carry disproportionate signal value: they particularly signal Iran’s intent and demonstrated capability to engage targets at the outer boundary of its publicly acknowledged range envelope, which puts most of Europe, if credibly vetted, within IRGC threat radius. This sounds as alarming as it may.
What This Brief May Not Answer
Projectile volume is a necessary but inadequate measure of campaign effect. Intercept rates, physical damage assessments, and second-order economic impact data remain required to translate strike counts into a complete picture of strategic effect. Qatar’s disproportionate missile share warrants closer scrutiny: the distribution is consistent with Al Udeid targeting, but without target-type confirmation this assessment remains solely inferential. The absence of comprehensive damage assessment data and complete interception data from GCC competent authorities, where it exists, are among the principal analytical gap in the current dataset. The numbers here should be taken as minimums.
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Source: GCC MoDs, competent authorities, INSS, media reporting & OSINT. Horizon Insights datasets.
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